**Appendix for Online Publication**

**”Coup Leaders: A New Comprehensive Dataset, 1950-2020”**

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**Replication Thyne and Powell (2016) with the Coup Leaders Dataset**

Table A1 reports the regression results underlying the left coefficient plot in figure 4 of the main text. The models underlying this plot test the link between recent coups (regardless of success or failure) and post-coup democratization. Model 1 reports the regression results from Model 3 of the original analysis by Thyne and Powell (2016), which uses the coup data by Powell and Thyne (2011). Models 2-5 in table A1 rerun this model using data on senior, mid-rank, and junior officer coups from the Coup Leaders Dataset.

Table A2 reports the regression results underlying the coefficient plot in the middle of figure 4 of the main text. The models underlying this plot test the link between recent successful coups and post-coup democratization. Model 5 reports the regression results from Model 1 of the original analysis by Thyne and Powell (2016). Models 6-8 in table A2 rerun this model using data on successful senior, mid-rank, and junior officer coups from the Coup Leaders Dataset.

Table A3 reports the regression results underlying the coefficient plot on the right of figure 4 of the main text. The models underlying this plot test the link between recent failed coups and post-coup democratization. Model 9 reports the regression results from Model 2 of the original analysis by Thyne and Powell (2016). Models 10-12 in table A3 rerun this model using data on failed senior, mid-rank, and junior officer coups from the Coup Leaders Dataset.

**Table A1. Coup Types and Post-Coup Democratization**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | M1 | M2 | M3 | M4 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Recent Coup (T&P) | 0.723\*\*\* |  |  |  |
|  | (0.272) |  |  |  |
| Recent senior officer coup |  | 0.668\*\* |  |  |
|  |  | (0.330) |  |  |
| Recent mid-rank officer coup |  |  | 0.953\*\*\* |  |
|  |  |  | (0.346) |  |
| Recent junior officer coup |  |  |  | 1.072\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.495) |
| Previous democracy | 0.893\*\*\* | 0.881\*\*\* | 0.891\*\*\* | 0.884\*\*\* |
|  | (0.255) | (0.254) | (0.254) | (0.253) |
| Former British colony | -0.115 | -0.105 | -0.109 | -0.115 |
|  | (0.293) | (0.292) | (0.292) | (0.292) |
| GDP/capita, ln | 0.596\*\* | 0.534\*\* | 0.554\*\* | 0.536\*\* |
|  | (0.253) | (0.249) | (0.251) | (0.249) |
| Ch. GDP/capita | -0.205 | -0.279 | -0.251 | -0.276 |
|  | (1.010) | (0.995) | (1.000) | (0.982) |
| Year of independence | -0.008\*\*\* | -0.008\*\*\* | -0.008\*\*\* | -0.008\*\*\* |
|  | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) |
| Cold War | -1.490\*\*\* | -1.511\*\*\* | -1.478\*\*\* | -1.495\*\*\* |
|  | (0.276) | (0.276) | (0.276) | (0.275) |
| Constant | 9.413\*\* | 9.865\*\* | 10.510\*\* | 10.241\*\* |
|  | (4.657) | (4.618) | (4.601) | (4.574) |
| Observations | 4838 | 4838 | 4838 | 4838 |
| Adjusted *R*2 | 0.08 | 0.08 | 0.08 | 0.08 |

Note: \* = p < 0.1; \*\* = p < 0.05; \*\*\* = p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by country. Time controls (authoritarian years, authoritarian years2 and authoritarian years3) included, but not reported.

**Table A2. Successful Coup Types and Post-Coup Democratization**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | M5 | M6 | M7 | M8 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Recent successful coup (T&P) | 0.740\*\* |  |  |  |
|  | (0.312) |  |  |  |
| Recent succ. senior officer coup |  | 0.748\*\* |  |  |
|  |  | (0.354) |  |  |
| Recent succ. mid-rank officer coup |  |  | 0.774 |  |
|  |  |  | (0.613) |  |
| Recent succ. junior officer coup |  |  |  | 1.353\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.627) |
| Previous democracy | 0.869\*\*\* | 0.877\*\*\* | 0.886\*\*\* | 0.888\*\*\* |
|  | (0.255) | (0.254) | (0.252) | (0.252) |
| Former British colony | -0.112 | -0.105 | -0.115 | -0.111 |
|  | (0.292) | (0.292) | (0.291) | (0.292) |
| GDP/capita, ln | 0.551\*\* | 0.515\*\* | 0.518\*\* | 0.515\*\* |
|  | (0.250) | (0.248) | (0.248) | (0.248) |
| Ch. GDP/capita | -0.243 | -0.320 | -0.301 | -0.270 |
|  | (1.000) | (0.982) | (0.966) | (0.984) |
| Year of independence | -0.008\*\*\* | -0.008\*\*\* | -0.008\*\*\* | -0.008\*\*\* |
|  | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) |
| Cold War | -1.521\*\*\* | -1.530\*\*\* | -1.500\*\*\* | -1.498\*\*\* |
|  | (0.278) | (0.278) | (0.276) | (0.275) |
| Constant | 9.958\*\* | 10.104\*\* | 10.941\*\* | 10.797\*\* |
|  | (4.620) | (4.616) | (4.551) | (4.556) |
| Observations | 4838 | 4838 | 4838 | 4838 |
| Adjusted *R*2 | 0.08 | 0.08 | 0.07 | 0.08 |

Note: \* = p < 0.1; \*\* = p < 0.05; \*\*\* = p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by country. Time controls (authoritarian years, authoritarian years2 and authoritarian years3) included, but not reported.

**Table A3. Failed Coup Types and Post-Coup Democratization**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | M9 | M10 | M11 | M12 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Recent failed coup (T&P) | 0.728\*\* |  |  |  |
|  | (0.324) |  |  |  |
| Recent failed senior officer coup |  | 0.396 |  |  |
|  |  | (0.618) |  |  |
| Recent failed mid-rank officer coup |  |  | 1.030\*\*\* |  |
|  |  |  | (0.379) |  |
| Recent failed junior officer coup |  |  |  | 0.947 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.635) |
| Previous democracy | 0.908\*\*\* | 0.897\*\*\* | 0.904\*\*\* | 0.886\*\*\* |
|  | (0.254) | (0.252) | (0.254) | (0.253) |
| Former British colony | -0.112 | -0.104 | -0.094 | -0.117 |
|  | (0.292) | (0.291) | (0.292) | (0.292) |
| GDP/capita, ln | 0.566\*\* | 0.506\*\* | 0.530\*\* | 0.517\*\* |
|  | (0.251) | (0.247) | (0.249) | (0.248) |
| Ch. GDP/capita | -0.215 | -0.298 | -0.264 | -0.303 |
|  | (0.999) | (0.965) | (0.994) | (0.966) |
| Year of independence | -0.008\*\*\* | -0.008\*\*\* | -0.008\*\*\* | -0.008\*\*\* |
|  | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) |
| Cold War | -1.465\*\*\* | -1.490\*\*\* | -1.473\*\*\* | -1.496\*\*\* |
|  | (0.274) | (0.274) | (0.276) | (0.275) |
| Constant | 9.752\*\* | 10.537\*\* | 10.236\*\* | 10.240\*\* |
|  | (4.615) | (4.555) | (4.610) | (4.574) |
| Observations | 4838 | 4838 | 4838 | 4838 |
| Adjusted *R*2 | 0.08 | 0.07 | 0.08 | 0.08 |

Note: \* = p < 0.1; \*\* = p < 0.05; \*\*\* = p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by country. Time controls (authoritarian years, authoritarian years2 and authoritarian years3) included, but not reported.

**References**

Powell, J. and Thyne, C. (2011) ‘Global Instances of Coups from 1950 to 2010: A New Dataset.’, Journal of Peace Research 48(3): 249–259.

Thyne, C. and Powell J. (2016) ‘Coup d’état or coup d’autocracy? How Coups Impact Democratization, 1950–2008’, Foreign Policy Analysis 12(2): 192–213.